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Introduction
What's at Stake?

In May 2016, several Danish researchers released data on 7o,ooo users of the
· elating website OKC upicl. Those of us who have tried online dating know that
profiles on OKCupid (or Match, JDate, or eHarmony) are rich in sensitive
personal information. The researchers published much of it: usernames, age,
gender, and location, as well as sexual orientation, fetishes, religious views,
and more. G iven the breadth of that information, it wouldn't take much to
figure out the identities of those involved. And the researchers neither
obtained consent nor anonymizecl the data.'
This data clump posed a privacy puzzle. OKCupid users voluntarily answer
hund reds of questions about themselves so the website can use an algorithm to
connect them with supposedly compatible matches. The answers are available
to all OKCupiclmembers, with some basic information ava ilable to nonmembers via a Coogle search of a person's name. For these reasons, while they may
have violated OKC upid's terms of use and ethical canons for research in the
social sciences, the researchers felt they were on solid privacy grounds. They
did not need to anonymize the data set, they sa id, because users had provided
the information in the first place and other people had already seen it. By any
traditional metric, they thought, this information was not private!
Notably, this wasn't an isolated incident. Researchers have mined personal
data before. 3 Retailers do it all the time, gathering everything from our
browsing histories to Facebook "likes" to target us with advertisements they
think we want to see. Coogle tailors its search results based on what it learns
from our behavior across platforms, sometimes discriminating against us in
the process. 4 D ata brokers amass vast collections of information about us
gleaned from across the Web and sell it to the highest bidder. Facebook is
steaming ahead with frighteningly accurate facial recognition technology
based on the millions of photos we upload for our friencls.5 Retailers analyze
our purchasing h istories to predict what we will buy next even before we know
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it ourselves. And marketers are using our buying patterns and CPS
technology to send sale notifications directly to our phones when we pass
a brick-and-mortar store.?
We have a choice. Our society is at a crossroads. We can live in a world
where these activities go on unabated, where stepping outside our homes and
using technology are information-sharing events, where the law cannot protect
us, and where the only things tl1at are truly private are tl1e things we keep
secret. In this world, anyone, whether they are overeager researchers or online
advertisers, can use our data because, as a matter oflaw and social practice, the
information is already public. We share our data the moment we sign up for an
account, or browse the Internet, or buy a book online. 8 In this world, privacy is
dead.
Or, we could live in a world where privacy still matters. In this less
totalitarian, more agreeable world, lawyers, judges, policymakers, teachers,
students, parents, and technology companies take privacy seriously. Here,
privacy has a fighting chance against other values and norms, and information
can be shared with others without the entire world looking on.
Today, we seem closer to privacy's death tl1an to its renaissance. Indeed,
talking heads have been writing privacy's obituary for years.9 That is in part
because, like the Danish researchers who took a cavalier approach to their
subjects' privacy, we have been thinking about privacy too narrowly.
Strengthening privacy won't be easy, but getting to a better world starts with
changing the way we think about privacy, how we integrate and manage it in
our daily lives, and how the law is used to protect it. And that is what this book
is about: I want to change the way we think about privacy so we can better
leverage law to protect it in a modern world.
We are accustomed to conceptualizing privacy in certain ways. We often
think that privacy is about separating from the prying eyes of others or keeping
things secret; that's why we draw blinds when we don't want people looking in.
Sometimes we associate privacy with certain spaces or property boundaries;
what we do "in the privacy of our own homes" or "behind closed doors" or in
our bedrooms and bathrooms, for example, is our business. Sometimes we
think privacy is bound up with intimacy; that's what makes topics like sex,
money, and medical care inherently personal. But I argue that limiting our
understanding of privacy to these concepts alone is what allows our data to be
mined and used with impunity. These ways of understanding privacy are, at
best, incomplete and, at worst, hurtling us toward a dystopian future designed
without privacy in mind.
For example, thinking tl1at privacy is synonymous with secrecy could help
us when someone hacks our personal network and publishes previously

encrypted files, but it doesn't offer much consolation for use rs of OKCupid
or for a victim of nonconsensual pornography who shared images with
a now-ex-boyfri end only to have him upload those pictures to Pornhub.
Once we share som ething, it's no longer secret, and we lose control of it. 10
Similarly, it may be sufficient for a homeowner who notices a dronemounted camera by h er window to th ink abo ut privacy as bound up with
enclosed spaces or property lines, but it would be radically insuffi cient the
moment sh e stepped outside. And although some of these victims could fall
back on the inherent intimacy of the information revealed to explain their
feeling that their privacy was invaded, privacy-as-inti macy cannot, on its
own, respond to the transfer of personal data among websites, behaviorally
targeted advertisem ents, and "big data" p redictive analytics that mine seemingly innocuous and nonintimate information from across the Internet to
determine what we see, what we buy, and what we learn.
We need to change our perspective on privacy.
It may sound strange, but privacy is an inherently social concept. The very
idea of privacy presumes that we exist in botl1 formal and informal relationships witl1 others: p rivacy only matters after we share within those relationships. When making sharing decisions, we rely on and develop expectations
about what should happen to our information based on the contexts in which
we share, thus integrating privacy into our lives relative to other people."
As the law professor Robert Post describes, privacy norms "rest[] not upon
a perceived opposi tion between persons and social life, but rather upon their
interdependence."' 2 Privacy, then, is socially situated . It is not a way to witl1draw or to limi t our connection to others. It is, at its core, about the social
relationships governing disclosure between and among individuals and
between users and the platforms tl1at collect, analyze, and manipulate their
information for some purpose.' 3
For example, when we share the fact that we are HIV-positive with the 100
members of an HIV support community, we may expect a far greater degree of
confidentiality and discretion from tl1em than from two acquaintances at
work. When we whisper secrets to a good friend, we expect confidentiality
even without a written agreement. We share our bank account numbers with
Bank of America's website and expect tl1at it won't be shared with online
marketers. And al though we may recognize that using the Internet or joining
a discount loyalty program requires some disclosure, we share our information
with the expectation that it will be used for the specific purpose for which we
shared it. What we share, witl1 whom we share it, and how we share it matter.
In other words, someiliing about the social context of disclosure is the key to
determining what is private and what is not.'4
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That key is trust. Trust is a resource of social capital between or among two
or more parties concerning the expectation that others will beh ave according
to accepted norms. It mitigates the vulnerability and power imbalance inherent in disclosure, allowing sharing to occur in the first place. Put another way,
disclosures happen in contexts of trust, and trust is what's broken when data
collection and use go too far. An information age demands an understand ing
of information privacy that recognizes that we share a substantial amount of
personal data with friends, public and private insti tutions, websites, and online
advertisers. More generally, a doctrine of information privacy must navigate
the public/private divide in context, recognizing, among other things, that
what we share, when we share, why we share, and with whom we share matter
for determining whether disclosed information is still legally protectable as
private.' 5 And it must not only explain what we consider private, but also why
6
certain things fall into the private sphere and why other things do not.' This
theory must also refl ect how information privacy is impl em ented on the
ground, including how we determine when and what to share, how platforms
manipulate us into disclosing more than we might otherwise have wanted, and
how, if at all, technology companies embed privacy norms in the data-hungry
products they create. And the theory must be administrable, capable of being
applied by lawyers and judges in real cases to answer real information privacy
questions. Finally, the way we think about privacy has to set us on a better path,
one that not only helps privacy thrive in a modern world, but also has positive
effects on society as a whole.
Because we share when we trust, I argue that we should start talking about,
thinking through , and operationalizing information privacy as a social norm
based on trust. In the context of information sharing, trust gives us the ability to
live with and minimize the vulnerability inherent in sharing by relying on
expectations of confidentiality and discretion. Indeed, all disclosures create
vulnerability and imbalances of power. Elsewhere, as in doctor-patient or
attorney-cl ient relationsh ips, where significant disclosures create similar
power imbalances, we m anage those risks with strong trust norms and powerful legal tools that protect and repair disclosure relationships. Reinvigorating
information privacy requires similar norms and legal weapons, as well. So,
when we share information with others in contexts of trust, that information
should be protected as private. I call this argument privacy-as-trust, and, like
other trust doctrines in the law, it allows disclosure to occur in safe environments buttressed by concurrent norms of confidentiality and discretion.
By the end of this book, my hope is that we will start considering trust as an
important part of our notion of information privacy. More specifically, my goal
is to argue that we should conceptualize information privacy in terms of

relationships of trust and leverage law to protect those relationships. This,
however, does not m ean that all other visions of privacy are useless. Important
rights-based concepts of privacy are not wrong; they are just incomplete.
On th eir own, they have difficulty answering some modern privacy questions
posed by new tech nologies like predictive analytics, social robots, and ongoing
and pervasive da ta collection. Privacy-as-trust can help get us on the path to
a better world where privacy not only exists, but thrives, and where society
benefits from a rejuvenation and strengthening of trust norms among individuals and between individuals and data collectors.
It is also important to note what this book is not about. Privacy takes on
many forms, in different contexts, with a variety of bogeymen ready to break or
erode it. T his project is about information privacy, generally, and privacy in
times of disclosure, specifically. It is primarily about the ways in which we
interact and share information with, and are vulnerable to, other private
actors - other individuals and technology companies, for example - rather
than government agents. That is not to say that conceptualizing privacy as
based on relationships of trust is necessarily silent or unhelpful in a variety of
contexts. But those extrapolations and extensions are for another book.
I construct my argument in three stages. Part I is about where we have been;
it develops and then critiques the many theories of privacy that dominate
current privacy scholarship, showing how each of them is a variant on the
sam e theme and has helped bring us to wh ere we are today. Part II is about the
theory of privacy-as-trust itself; it teases out the definition of trust, provides
empiri cal evidence in support of the relationship between trust and disclosure,
and shows how privacy-as-trust is already being operationalized on the ground .
It argues that trust must be part of our understanding of privacy, as a result. Part
III is about the better world with trust in it. I apply privacy-as-trust to several
vexing questions of privacy and information law, and show the contrast
between conventional and trust-based approaches. In all cases, understanding
privacy as bound up with the concept of trust brings about a better, more just
world where privacy is a strong social value.

4
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BY "PRIVACY"?

For many, privacy is about choice, autonomy, and ind ividual freedom .
It encompasses the individual's right to determine what she will keep hidden
and what, how, when, and to whom she will disclose personal information.
Privacy is her respite from the prying, conformist eyes of the rest of the world
and her expectation that things about h erself she wants to keep private will
remain so. I will call these ideas the rights conceptions of privacy to evoke their
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Lockean and Kantian foundations. And they can be divided into two categories. In Chapter 1, I discuss the definitions of privacy that are based on
negative rights, or those that see the private sphere as a place o~ freedom ~om
something. These notions of privacy include elemen.ts of secl~s1on a~d pnv~te
spaces, as well as conceptions based on the sanctity of pnvate thmgs, ~1ke
discrediting secrets or intimate information. Common to these ways of thi~1k
ing about privacy is an element of separation, suggesting that they pr~v1de
freedom from the public eye. Chapter 2 discusses the second category of ngl:tsbased definitions of privacy. These conceptualizations retain the assumptwn
of separation, but use it for a different purpose - namely, for the opportu~1ity to
grow, develop, and realize our full p~te~tial as fre~ persons. It conceives ~;
privacy as affirmatively for the full realization of the hberal,.autonomou~ self.
The rights conceptions of privacy pervade privacy rhetonc, s~holarsh1p, and
judicial decisions. They are the dominant ways we a1~proach pnva~y probl e.ms
today. They are, however, incomplete. They miss the fact that mforma.twn
privacy norms are triggered by disclosure. And disclosure i.s an ess~nbally
social behavior: once we share, we trade control of our mformabon for
reliance on powerful social norms, or background social rules that feed. into
our expectations of what should happen with our personal data . Pnvacy
centered solely on the individual ignores those social norms even thou~h
they are not only essential to sharing but have positive effects on social
solidarity. Without them, we risk narrowing privacy into oblivion.
9
Like the work of Robert Merton,' 8 Michel Foucault,' H elen
Nissenbaum, 20 and others, privacy-as-trust approaches information privacy
and disclosure from a social perspective. Privacy-as-trust recognizes that information privacy is not about excluding others, but rather about regula~ing the
flow of information to some, restricting it from some, and openmg Jt up to
others. This essential understanding about privacy's social role is not new, and
Chapter 3 focuses on describing the development of social theories of privacy
over the last 50 years. In that chapter, I argue that social theories o~ privacy ~o
date may have recognized that privacy is what manages infon~abon flow ~n
context, but they inadequately respond to the power dynamics at play 111
disclosure. That is the role of trust.
PART II: TRUST AND PRIVACY
Disclosure and privacy govern our relationships with others (p ersons as well as
technology platforms); as such, they are social phenomena. Trust is the link
between them . And strong trust norms are what allow sharing and social
interaction to occur."
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Particular social trust is the "favourable expectation regarding other people's actions and intentions," or the belief that others will behave in
a predictable manner." It "begins where knowledge ends"2 3 and is the mutual
"faithfulness" on which all social interaction depends."'~ For example, when
an individual speaks with relative strangers in a support group like Alcoholics
~nonymous, sh e trusts that they will not divulge her secrets. Trust, therefore,
mcludes a willingness to accept some risk and vulnerability toward others and
steps in to grease the wheels of social activity!5 I cannot know for certain that
my fellow support group members will keep my confidences, so trust allows
me to interact with them, disclose information, and rely on discretion with
confidence. And I earn all sorts of positive rewa rds as a result!6
It makes sense, then, to turn to trust when thinking about what motivates us
to share personal information online and what governs the related privacy
norms in social interaction: Alice shares information with Brady because Alice
tr.usts Brady with that information; the applicable norms - confidentiali ty and
discretion - give Alice the confidence and comfort to share with Brady,
mitigating the vulnerability inherent in someone else having access to her
home. The same mechanism is at play when we share information with
~~wyers, doctors, and financial planners: strong trust norms, backed by tradiIon, professional standards, and the law, give us th e confidence and comfort to
share. Despite the intuitive appeal of that mechanism, particular social trust
h.as been, at best, a silent undercurrent in a growing literature on our propenSity to disclose personal information. Part II of this book teases out this privacy,
sharing, and trust relationship.
The theory of privacy-as-trust is the subject of Chapters 4 and 5· Privacy-astrust posits that information disclosed in contexts defined by trust should be
legal~y protected as private. It is not an attempt at a unitary, a priori defi nition
of pnvacy that applies to all situations!7 But privacy-as-trust does give us a way
of understanding how private disclosure contexts vary from context to context
~nd why certain uses of data strike us as invasive and unfair. Thinking about
mformation privacy as based on relationships of trust means several things.
It m~ans seeing privacy as something that can fos ter disclosure by mitigating
the .nsks inherent in disclosure and rebalancing power between sharers and
audiences. It means looking at the context of disclosure to determine the
difference between public and private information. It m eans considering both
norms at the time of disclosure and any background that has an impact on
future expectations. And it means asking how the law can be used to
~trengthen relationships of trust between parties and equalizing the power
un~alances that come with sharing. Doing this will have significant value to
SOCiety.
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Chapter 4 also offers som e evidence that privacy-as-trust reflects how we
operationalize privacy and disclosure decisions in practice. An empirical study
ofFacebook users, summarized here, suggests that trust is a key factor in users'
decisions to share personal information on the platform. And, as scholars have
shown, many companies with strong privacy leaders at the top think about
their privacy obligations as protecting and fostering trust between the company and its customers.'8 Therefore, if trust is defining our understanding of
privacy on the ground , perhaps the law and privacy theory can catch up.

judges to d etermine the difference between publi c and private information.
But when judges, as many do today, d efin e privacy as synonymous with
secrecy, victims of privacy invasions are left out in the cold. Privacy-as-trust,
like other social theories of privacy, recognizes that privacy exists postdisclosure and provides judges with clear, easy-to-apply questions to m ake
more nuanced decisions.

PART III: PRIVACY-AS-TRUST IN ACTION
The balance of the book considers what information privacy law would look
like if we applied privacy-as-trust to several ongoing privacy and information
law controversies. There are five chapters in this section, each of which uses
case studies to show how a privacy law regime based on trust would look
different than the status quo. In each case, some amount of disclosure causes
risk, vulnerability, and a loss of power; privacy-as-trust restores the trust norms
that protect those disclosures in th e first place.
Chapter 6 starts at the macro level, considering Internet platforms' obligations and responsibilities. The current regime, which requires data collectors
do little more than provide us with notice of what information data they collect
and what they do with it after collection, is based on the idea, discussed in
Chapter 2, that privacy is about the freedom to choose when and how to
disclose personal information. As many scholars have argued, however, this
"notice-and-choice" approach is hopel essly flawed and inadequate. It gives
users little to no help when making disclosure decisions, and it offers even less
protection when Internet companies use our data in unexpected and invasive
ways. This is especially problematic where web platforms use artificial intelligence (AI) or complex algorithms to learn about us, predict the things we want
to see, and mediate our online experiences. A reorientation of privacy law
around principles of trust would address these gaps, providing the necessary
theoretical justification for holding data collectors to certain fiduciary responsibilities of loyalty. As the legal scholars Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, and
others have argued, this would protect us from Internet platforms that are
already inducing our trust, taking our data, and harming us for their own
profit.
Chapter 7 goes from m acro to micro, applying privacy-as-trust to several
cases about the wide dissemination of information previously disclosed under
limited circumstances. These cases apply the current privacy torts, including
intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts, which require

9

Chapter 8 argues that privacy-as-trus t forces us to think differen tly about
privacy harms. Currently, most scholars and judges see invasions of privacy as
attacks on the individual. Privacy-as-trust recognizes that because trust is what
facilitates and regula tes information flows, injuri es to informa tion p rivacy are
injuries to the norms of social interaction. This opens up a new avenue for
protecting personal privacy: a robust tort of breach of confidentiality.
Traditionally marginalized in American law, the tort is perfectly suited to
protecting the privacy of previously disclosed information. T his chapter looks
at one type of cyberharassm ent - nonconsensual pornography or so-called
revenge porn- as an illustrative case study.
Chapter 9 steps outside the confines of privacy to show tha t privacy-as-trust
can be used as a more gen eral theory of information flows. Using a case study
of patent law's public use bar, which prevents inventors from securing a patent
if they have shared their invention with the public more than one yea r prior to
application, this chapter m akes several argum ents. Judges today apply some of
the same rights-based principles discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 to define
"public" in the public use bar. This has the perverse effect of privileging
wealthy corporate inven tors because it ignores the unique social determinants
of information flows am ong solo entrepreneurs. Privacy-as-trust not only
addresses that imbalance but also provides a clear, admin istrable, and fair
way to distinguish public from private inventions.
Finally, Chapter 10 discusses social robots. Social robots -like Sony's Aibo
dog or Kaspar, a machine with humanl ike qualities designed by the University
ofHertfordshire to help children with autism learn how to respond to othersare m achines that interact with humans on a social level. T h ey pose special
legal challenges tha t traditional understandings of privacy cannot comprehend. Social robots are both wonderful and insidious, and their dangers are
directly related to th eir benefits: while helping us meet founda tional human
needs of companionship, friendship, and emotional connectedness, they
distract us as they sweep in troves of personal data . Plus, as m achines with
humanish tendencies, they elicit more emotional responses than rational
ones. This makes us vulnerable, especially in a conventional privacy world
where mere use of a technology product is considered consen t to ongoing data
collection. Privacy-as-trust explains the dangers of social robots - we are
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primed to trust them and, as result, eager to share - and suggests ways to

PART I

protect ourselves in the process.
I conclude by summarizing my argument and suggesting avenues for future
research. Privacy-as-trust is not about keeping more information private or
making more information public. Thinking about privacy as a social norm
based on trust can help individuals protect themselves against invasions of
privacy. It can also foster disclosure where needed. It fosters productive
relationships, both commercial and social. And it fosters powerful trust
norms that could bring us closer to each other and to technology companies
who act responsibly with our data. If we know that the websites we use respect
our trust-based disclosure expectations, we may feel comfortable sharing more
information to enhance our online experiences. We just need a new way of
thinking about privacy that works for us, not just for data collectors. This book

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY "PRIVACY"?

offers that opportunity.

Disclosures, whether to each other or Internet companies, create power
imbalances. Sharers become vulnerable to their audien ces when they
disclose. A doctrine of information privacy must mitigate that vulnerability. If it doesn't, sharing stops. And a society of secret keepers is no society
at all.
D eveloping that doctrine starts with determining what we mean by the
word "private." This is an essential task. The way we think about privacy, in
general, helps determine when we can leverage law to protect it. Scholars
have been trying to conceptualize and frame a legal right to privacy since at
least 1890, when Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis wrote a now-famous article in the Harvard Law Review. It is hard to
overstate the impact of their work. Now the most cited law review article of
all time, it spawned a dynamic and still ongoing debate among lawyers,
social scientists, and policymakers abo ut what privacy means and how the
law can protect it.
Privacy scholarship may be teeming with different conceptions of privacy, but the differences among th em mask widespread agreement about
their rights-based assumptions. And these assumptions are putting privacy at
risk in th e modern world because they inadequately respond to the power
dynamics inh erent in disclosure. My goal for Chapters 1 and 2, then, is
twofold. First, I will tease out some of the trad itional definitions of privacy
and show that many of them are just different expressions of the same
th~me: privacy and society are in tension, the argument goes, because
pnvacy is about privileging the individual and individual rights over society.
And, second, I will sh ow that, as reflections of that rights-based theme, these
conceptualizations of privacy are not well equipped to answer a number of
modern privacy questions. They are leading us down a path to a world
where privacy no longer exists.
11

